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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE TEXAS
SUPREME COURT REMOVES ALL TIME
LIMITS ON "UNGRANTING"
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Tracy L. Matlock
N In re Baylor Medical Center at Garland,1 the Texas Supreme Court
changed its interpretation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b,
thereby allowing a trial court to vacate an order granting a new trial
at any time until a final judgment is entered. This decision overruled
forty-seven years of precedent. The supreme court based its decision on
an incorrect interpretation of Porter v. Vick,2 mistakenly finding that a
well-established practice was hypothetical and that a twenty-seven year
old amendment to the rules required a change in its interpretation. This
new interpretation prevents minor problems, but allows for extensive
abuse by the judiciary and through the political process.
The writ for mandamus was brought in a medical malpractice suit be-
tween Baylor Medical Center and Tammy and Steve Williams. The jury
found for Baylor, and Judge Cox entered a final take-nothing judgment
on May 6, 2005. A timely motion for new trial was granted on the eighty-
second day after the judgment was signed. The Dallas Court of Appeals
denied Baylor's writ of mandamus, which was then subsequently filed
with the Texas Supreme Court. The supreme court abated the case pursu-
ant to Rule 7.23 because Judge Thomas had succeeded Judge Cox. After
two months, Judge Thomas vacated the new trial order, reinstating judg-
ment on the jury's verdict. Baylor notified the Texas Supreme Court and
the case was dismissed as moot. On the same day, the Williamses peti-
tioned Judge Thomas to reconsider, resulting in the reinstatement of the
new trial order, and Baylor again appealed to the Texas Supreme Court
for relief. While the case was pending, Judge Jordan was elected to re-
place Judge Thomas.
The Texas Supreme Court abated the case a second time for considera-
tion by Judge Jordan on August 29, 2008.4 In doing so, the court explic-
itly overruled Porter v. Vick, holding that its decision in Porter was based
1. In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2008).
2. Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1994).
3. TEX. R. Civ. P. 7.2.
4. Baylor, 280 S.W.3d at 232.
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on the "purely hypothetical event" that the trial court's plenary power
over the judgment expires as if the motion had not been granted. 5 In-
stead, the court held that "[p]lenary power of course expires only after
final judgments, not vacated judgments."'6 The Porter decision followed
over thirty years of precedent established by Fulton v. Finch in 1961. 7
The court held, however, that this precedent was not controlling because
the determinative language for the Fulton decision was deleted in 1981
when the rule was amended.8
The issue of when a trial court has plenary power to vacate its order
granting a new trial was first decided by the Texas Supreme Court in
Fulton v. Finch.9 In that case, the court held that the language of Rule
329b(3) 10 was clear, requiring that "'all motions.., must be determined
within not exceeding forty-five (45) days after the original or amended
motion is filed' "; therefore, a motion "cannot be undetermined after the
45-day period without destroying the rule."" In Baylor, the court ruled
that its decision in Fulton had rested on the wording of the 1960 version
of Rule 329b that required motions for new trial to be "determined"
within forty-five days of filing.12 The court found this interpretation of
the rule no longer applies because this language was deleted in 1981, leav-
ing no limits on plenary power once the motion is granted. 13 The current
version of Rule 329b establishes that a motion for new trial is considered
overruled by law if not determined within seventy-five days after the
judgment was signed.14 However, the trial court has plenary power over
the motion for an additional thirty days after it is overruled. 15
The court in Baylor overruled its decision in Porter, noting that it had
not considered these amendments. 16 The court instead found that the
Porter decision was based on the "purely hypothetical event" that plenary
power expires as if the judgment had not been vacated, but "plenary
power of course expires only after final judgments, not vacated judg-
ments. 1'7 In Porter, an order vacating a new trial was found void under
5. Id. at 230.
6. Id.
7. Id.; Fulton v. Finch, 346 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. 1961).
8. Baylor, 280 S.W.3d at 230.
9. Fulton, 346 S.W.2d at 826.
10. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b has been renumbered. Rule 329b(3) and (5)
correlate to the current 329b(c) and (e), respectively.
11. Fulton, 346 S.W.2d at 826 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(3) (1954, amended 1960)).
12. Baylor, 280 S.W.3d at 230 (citing Fulton, 346 S.W.2d at 826).
13. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e)).
14. "In the event an original or amended motion for new trial or a motion to modify,
correct or reform a judgment is not determined by written order signed within seventy-five
days after the judgment was signed, it shall be considered overruled by operation of law on
expiration of that period." TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
15. "If a motion for new trial is timely filed by any party, the trial court... has plenary
power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty
days after all such timely-filed motions are overruled, either by a written order or by oper-
ation of law, whichever comes first." TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).




the Fulton rule because it was signed long after the expiration of plenary
power, which had occurred seventy-six days after the judgment was
signed.18 In making this determination, the court clarified that it "did not
substantively modify the Fulton v. Finch rule in Fruehauf Corp. v. Car-
rillo ... but merely clarified that the trial court could vacate, or 'ungrant,'
the new trial within the plenary power period." 19 FruehaufO° was the first
case decided by the Texas Supreme Court following the 1981 amendment
to Rule 329b. Applying Fulton, the supreme court held that ungranting a
motion for new trial on the seventy-fifth day was valid because there was
no reason to restrict the trial court within the seventy-five day period and
doing so would be inconsistent with the trial court's inherent plenary
power.21
The supreme court also made several practical arguments in favor of its
decision to overrule Porter. First, it noted that reinstating an original
judgment resets the appellate timetables, ensuring that the right to appeal
is not lost.22 Second, while the court acknowledged that time and money
could be wasted by continual reconsideration of orders, it held that never
allowing the trial judge to reconsider would also be wasteful. Finally, the
court noted that "a deadline that appears only in case law sets a trap for
judges and litigants like the one they fell into here."'23
Justice Johnson dissented from the opinion of the court, arguing that
the problems with the rule established by Porter v. Vick should be ad-
dressed through the rule-making process rather than by the court.24 He
interpreted the decision in Fulton as based on the rationale that "[it was
not the intention of the rule that an order granting a motion for new trial
should remain open to countermand until a term of court which might be
of six month's duration should finally expire."'25 The Texas Supreme
Court first applied this reasoning in the late nineteenth century, holding
that an order granting a motion for new trial could not be set aside after
the end of the term in which it was granted.26 The dissent also pointed
out that both cases decided by the court in the twenty-seven years since
Rule 329b was amended were based on the principle that plenary power
to vacate an order granting a new trial expires the day it would have if the
judgment was not vacated.27 Appellate courts have consistently applied
this precedent, even though they have questioned it, and it has been criti-
cized by the Supreme Court Advisory Council.2 8 Therefore, the dissent
18. Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789, 789-90 (Tex. 1994).
19. Id.
20. Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1993).
21. Id. at 84.
22. Baylor, 280 S.W.3d at 231.
23. Id. at *3.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 232 (quoting Fulton, 346 S.W.2d at 827).
26. Wells v. Melville, 25 Tex. 337 (1860); City of San Antonio v. Dickman, 34 Tex. 647
(1870).





found that the court should "adhere to the rule of Fulton and Porter until
and unless Rule 329b is amended. '2 9 In support of this conclusion, Jus-
tice Johnson noted that adopted rules have the same force as statutes and
greater force of stare decisis is accorded to "statutory-like promulga-
tions."'30 For this reason, the dissent appled the interpretation in Fiess v.
State Farm Lloyds of a form issued by a state which was based on the
argument, that the form would have been changed in the past twenty-five
years if the interpretation was incorrect. 31 The dissent argued that the
interpretation of a rule adopted by the court should be given "at least the
same deference" as a state agency's form.32 Therefore, the rule should
not be reinterpreted twenty-seven years after it was last amended.
Justice Johnson also noted several practical reasons for applying the
Porter interpretation of the rule to the Baylor case. The most important
of these reasons is that the parties need a designated point when they can
put the original judgment behind them and focus on preparing for a new
trial, rather than moving for reconsideration every time a colorable argu-
ment could be made. 33 The facts in the case demonstrate that every time
a new judge takes over, the order granting a new trial has to be reconsid-
ered. 34 He also pointed out the possibility that the trial court would have
the power to grant multiple trials and then pick the jury verdict it favors,
at least in theory. 35
Justice Johnson is correct that the long-standing interpretation of rules
should be changed only by amending those rules, rather than by the
court. The court tried to use the rulemaking process in 2002 and re-
quested that the Supreme Court Advisory Committee consider amending
the rules.36 The Committee raised several practical concerns relating to
the timing of ungranting new trials. First, it noted that time and money
are spent preparing for a new trial, thus some cutoff prior to the second
trial is required so that the parties know that time and money will not be
wasted.37 Second, the committee discussed the possibility of political de-
cisions controlling the process following the election of a new judge who
was allowed to reconsider the order without having heard evidence. 38
Third, it raised the potential of abuse by judges, who are free to choose
the first verdict over the second after completion of the second trial by
29. Id. at 238.
30. Id. (citing Feiss v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 459-50 (Tex. 2006)).





36. HEARING OF THE SuP. CT. ADVISORY COMMITrEE, Mar. 8, 2002, 5918-5956, http://
supreme.courts.state.tx.usrulesscacarchives/2002/transcripts/030802pm.pdf; MEETING OF
THE Sup. CT. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, June 14, 2002, 6732-6774, http://supreme.courts.state.
tx.us/rules/scac/archives/2002/transcripts/061402am.pdf.
37. HEARING OF THE SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Mar. 8, 2002, supra note 36, at
5925, 5930.
38. Id. at 5938.
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ungranting the motion to have that second trial. 39 The Committee also
noted the possibility that developments in the law could call for the rein-
statement of the verdict after a new trial was granted, but that this situa-
tion could be resolved through summary judgment. 40 The Committee
voted thirteen to two in favor of amending 329b(e) to allow an additional
thirty-day period for a judge to reconsider a motion for new trial after he
granted it.41 However, this change was never enacted. These potential
abuses were ignored by the Texas Supreme Court in its cursory discussion
of the potential for waste, which provided no support for its claim that
waste would occur by not allowing reconsideration of orders granting
new trials. As the committee noted, the purpose of the rules is to prevent
abuse, therefore these concerns should outweigh the court's unsubstanti-
ated reference to the possibility of waste caused by proceeding with the
second trial.42
Not only did the Texas Supreme Court go outside the proper process
for changing rules, but it also based its decision to do so on an incorrect
interpretation of Porter. The court found that twenty-seven years of pre-
cedent was based on a "purely hypothetical event: the expiration of ple-
nary power assuming that a vacated judgment had instead become
final."'43 This reading of Porter is wrong because no court has ever held
that vacated judgments should be treated as final. Plenary power does
not end over the case, requiring that the vacated judgment be understood
as final, but rather only the power to reinstate the judgment expires as
required by Rule 329b(c) and (e), 44 with the court retaining power over
the new trial. Furthermore, the majority of appellate courts in Texas
have held that this "purely hypothetical event" actually occurred, apply-
ing the supreme court's interpretation of Rule 329b.45 It is ridiculous for
the court to suggest that an event based on practice in Texas extending
back to 1860 is purely hypothetical; practice that has been consistently
followed for nearly 150 years is nothing if not established.
The amendment to Rule 329b does not require a new interpretation, as
the court implies, which is why the court did not overrule Fulton for
39. MEETING OF THE SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, June 14, 2002, supra note 36, at
6738.
40. Id. at 6745-46.
41. Id. at 6773.
42. Id. at 6739.
43. In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex. 2002).
44. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c), (e).
45. See, e.g., Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789, 789 (Tex. 1994); In re Hildebrandt, No. 09-
07-638-CV, 2008 WL 59179, at *1 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Jan. 4, 2008, no pet.); Garcia v.
Rodriguez, 155 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.); In re Luster, 77 S.W.3d
331, 335 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Health Care Ctrs. Of Tex., Inc. v.
Nolen, 62 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.); In re Steiger, 55 S.W.3d 168,
170-71 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); In re Ellebracht, 30 S.W.3d 605, 607
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.); Ferguson v. Globe-Texas Co., 35 S.W.3d 688, 690
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.); In re Marriage of Wilburn, 18 S.W.3d 837, 843 n.3
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.); In re Hidalgo, No. 05-06-00966-CV, 2008 WL 3854463, at
*4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 20, 2008, no pet. h.); Allen v. McKenzie Realty Corp., No. 01-
90-00016-CV, 1991 WL 74222, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 1991, no writ).
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twenty-seven years after the amendment. The plain language of 329b(c)
requires that plenary power over a new trial motion ends at the expira-
tion of seventy-five days from the date the judgment was signed. 46 Rule
329b(e) only applies to overruled motions, and thus applied to the facts in
Baylor where a motion for new trial was not granted until the eighty-
second day.47 Therefore, the court retained power for an additional
thirty days, for a total of 105 days after the judgment was signed. The
rule has been interpreted in this way since its revision in 1981.48 While
the rules do not explicitly deny or grant courts the power to vacate an
order granting a new trial, the consistent interpretation serves to fill this
lack of clarity in the rules.
The two practical problems with the Porter decision noted by the court
are not serious enough to warrant changing the rules outside of the estab-
lished procedure. First, the court noted that waste could occur under the
Porter rule by never allowing the court to vacate, but it did not clarify
how this could occur. The court likely meant that a problem could arise
under Porter because courts lose all opportunity to vacate if they wait
until the seventy-fifth day to grant a motion for new trial. Yet the rules
allow courts at least forty-five days to consider the motion after it was
filed. Therefore, the opposing party has adequate time to develop and
submit all colorable arguments against granting the motion. The only
reasons a court may need to ungrant the motion after this period would
be upon changes in the law or the development of new facts, but either of
these circumstances could be addressed through summary judgment.49
Second, the court noted that the Fulton rule is case law, but was wrong in
holding that this creates a trap to both litigants and judges. No trap can
exist for litigants since the motion for new trial must be filed within thirty
days of the judgment. A diligent opposing counsel will petition the court
to deny the motion before it is ruled upon, thereby having no cause to
have the motion ungranted several weeks later. It is difficult to claim that
a trap exists for judges in well-settled case law that has been consistently
followed for forty-seven years. The claim that it is a trap implies that the
rule is hidden or designed to confuse the court or the litigants. Yet, a
simple cursory review of case law would reveal the rule. Since the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure do not clearly address whether a court has
power to vacate an order granting a new trial, a diligent lawyer or judge
would turn to case law for interpretation. Furthermore, the judge did not
fall into a trap in this case as the court held. A newly elected judge at-
tempted to ungrant a valid order issued by her predecessor. She did not
lack knowledge of the deadline causing her to fall into the trap of missing
it; rather, she never had the power to act.
46. TEX. R. Cv. P. 329b(c).
47. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
48. See supra note 45.




The Baylor holding has a huge potential for abuse by trial courts that
the Texas Supreme Court ignored. First, it gives the trial court complete
discretion to vacate an order granting a new trial at any time before it
issues a final judgment. This could waste a large amount of time and
money spent by both parties preparing for the trial if the order was va-
cated on the eve of or after the second trial. Additionally, it allows for
major abuse by the judge by giving him power to hear multiple jury ver-
dicts and then determine which to issue as the final judgment. Theoreti-
cally, nothing would prevent a judge from ordering multiple trials until a
jury issued a verdict he agreed with. This situation occurred in a Fifth
Circuit case, where the court upheld the trial judge's decision under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate the order granting a new trial
after the second jury returned its verdict.50 This was the main abuse con-
sidered by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, but the Baylor deci-
sion does not even address the issue.51 Second, the decision allows for
abuse through the political process because every newly elected judge has
the power to overrule all pending new trial orders, without having heard
any evidence in the cases. 52 Thus, pressure could be exerted through the
political system to elect a judge who would reinstate a verdict, even if the
order for new trial was validly granted. This abuse does not exist in the
federal courts because the judges are appointed, which helps explain why
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have no limitations on when the
order can be vacated. Thus, under the Baylor holding, the public will
potentially lose respect for the judicial system because of both judicial
abuse and wasted time and money.
The Texas Supreme Court went outside of established procedures to
change Rule 329b by reinterpreting it in Baylor, overruling forty-seven
years of precedent. This decision was based on incorrect interpretation,
with the result that a practice that has been consistently followed in Texas
for almost 150 years was found to be "purely hypothetical." The existing
problems with the long-standing interpretation were not serious enough
to require altering the rules outside of the proper process, especially since
doing so created the potential for judicial and political abuse that could
become far more harmful that the existing practice had been.
50. Gallimore v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 635 F.2d 1165, 1171 (5th Cir. 1981).
51. MEETING OF THE SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMMIa'TEE, June 14, 2002, supra note 36, at
6738. The Committee refers to a Fifth Circuit case in which this situation occurred. The
trial court's decision to vacate the motion granting a new trial was made only after the
second jury verdict was upheld under the doctrine of complete plenary power. Gallimore,
635 F.2d at 1171.
52. HEARING OF THE SUP. Cr. ADVISORY COMMITrEE, Mar. 8, 2002, supra note 36, at
5938.
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